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Jenkins: Administrative Law

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION OR
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION: PRIORITIES
IN EDUCATING STUDENTS WITH
DISABILITIES

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified School Dist.,l the
Ninth Circuit held that a school district need neither provide
nor bear the cost of providing certain individualized educational services to students with disabilities. 2 A school district must
furnish only those services outlined in an individualized education plan (hereinafter "IEP"), developed annually by the local
educational agency, for each individual with a disability.3 Required to supply a free appropriate education by federal law, a
school district must offer the special education and related
services necessary to meet the unique needs of the individual!
However, a school district has no responsibility to render or
pay for any special education or related services beyond those
specified in the IEP. 5
Additionally, with regard to education for children with
disabilities, the Ninth Circuit ruled that until a party exhausts
available administrative remedies provided by federal law,

1. Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994)
(per Leavy, J. with whom Alarcon, J. and Kleinfeld, J. joined).
2. [d. at 230.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5-6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
4. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(D) (1988).
5. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 233.
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courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to review complaints. 6
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Kristy Dreher, a 7-year old student, registered in the Amphitheater Unified School District (hereinafter "Amphitheater")
for the 1989-90 school year. 7 Amphitheater placed her at the
Arizona School for the Deaf and Blind.s Dreher has been profoundly deaf since birth. 9 Her parents wanted her to learn to
read lips and speak, rather than rely on sign language for
communication. 10
In 1989, Amphitheater evaluated the effects of various
education methods on Dreher's ability to learn.ll The district
found that an educational program which focused exclusively
on oral methods would not work well for Dreher. 12 Therefore,
her individualized education program (hereinafter "IEP")13
emphasized sign language instruction, but called for "oral
methods with augmentative communication," including sign
language, lip reading and oral training.14

6. ld. at 235.
7. Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 797 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D. Ariz.
1992).
8. ld. at 755.
9. ld.
10. Dreher v. Ampitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228, 228 (9th Cir. 1994).
Since the 19th century, educators have disputed the best method of teaching deaf
children to communicate. Because sign language has a different structure from
that of English, advocates of the spoken word maintain that "oralism" helps deaf
persons assimilate into society. Oralists believe speaking and lip reading English
is essential to success in the hearing world. This approach relies on using the
English language and being able to speak, understand, read, and write in English.
See Judith Randal & William Hines, The Deaf Speak Out; New Power for a Divided Minority, WASHINGTON POST, March 29, 1988, Health, at 15.
11. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230.
12. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 755. Amphitheater based this conclusion on extensive testing of Dreher's learning methods and her performance in a 2-year speech
therapy program which used only oral/auditory methods.
13. Local school districts must develop an individualized education plan [hereinafter "IEpl ] which is a personalized plan designed to meet the unique educational needs of the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5).
14. See Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 756. "Oral training" involves teaching the
communicator to speak. Many hearing impaired persons with hearing aids have
achieved functional and recognizable speech. However, persons who have been
profoundly deaf from birth (as is Kristy Dreher) have no concept of the sounds
they create or those they wish to, and generally fail to attain the proficiency nec-
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Attempting to eliminate the sign language component of
Dreher's IEP, her parents appealed the district's choice of
teaching methods through the administrative hearing process
made available by Amphitheater. 15 Amphitheater held due
process hearings in December 1989 and January 1990. 16 The
hearing officer determined that Amphitheater's proposed methodology was appropriate. 17 Dreher's parents appealed this determination to the Arizona Department of Education, which
subsequently upheld the hearing officer's decision. 18
Dreher's parents, rather than allow Dreher to remain in
the public school system and learn sign language during the
two-month administrative appeals process, removed her from
the Arizona Center for the Deaf and Blind and enrolled her in
St. Joseph's Academy (hereinafter "the Academy").19 The
Academy is a private school that forbids the use of sign language and provides speech therapy specifically designed to
teach lip reading and speaking.20

essary to communicate orally with the hearing world. See Barbara Mathias, A Way
of Hearing So to Speak, WASHINGTON POST, April 7, 1989, Style, at 5.
15. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 755. In 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) and (c) (1988), the
administrative remedies an educational agency must make available to appeal an
IEP are outlined.
Whenever a complaint has been received . . . the
parents . . . shall have an opportunity for an impartial
due process hearing . . . conducted by the State educa·
tional agency or by the local educational agency or the
intermediate educational unit, as determined by State law
or by the State educational agency.

[. . . • 1
If the hearing required in [ . . . 1 this section is
conducted by a local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit, any party aggrieved by the findings
and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal to
the State educational agency which shall conduct an impartial review of such hearing. The officer conducting such
review shall make an independent decision upon completion of such review."
Dreher, 22 F.3d. at 231 n.3 (ellipses in original) (citations omitted).
16. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 755.
17. [d.
18. [d. Federal law permits an appeal to a state educational agency. See 20
U.S.C. § 1417 (1988).
19. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230.
20. [d. Until the 1970's most deaf students learned to communicate orally, and
were discouraged from using sign language. Today, factions of the deaf community
advocate various communication methods including: American Sign Language (stan-
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Dreher's parents paid private school tuition at the Academy from January 1990 to September 1990. 21 They requested
reimbursement from Amphitheater for the cost of Dreher's
speech therapy provided at the Academy and payment for the
costs of any oral method speech therapy necessary to Dreher's
education in the future. 22 Amphitheater contended that it had
no obligation to pay for the special services, since speech therapy in lieu of other methods conflicted with Dreher's IEP. 23
Amphitheater claimed it offered Dreher the educational services specified in her IEP at public expense, had the family chosen to avail themselves of those services.24 The district further argued that it provided all of the services required by law
by making the program specified in Dreher's IEP available at
no cost to the family.25
The administrative appeal, conducted by the Arizona Department of Education, resulted in two determinations. 26
First, the hearing officer found that the IEP met the school's
responsibility to provide Dreher with a "free and appropriate
public education."27 Dreher's IEP would therefore not be
changed to eliminate instruction using sign language. 28 Second, the hearing officer ruled that the school district need not
grant Dreher a due process hearing to determine financial
responsibility for the cost of the oral methods training at the
Academy.29
Following the final determination by the Arizona Department of Education in June 1991, Dreher appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Tucson

dardized hand movements with a grammatical base unrelated to English), Signed
English (a precise translation of English using signs and fingerspelling), Oralism
(see supra note 10 for definition), or Total Communication (a combination of oral
methods, lipreading, signing and fingerspelling). See Randal & Hines, supra note
10.
21. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 755.
22. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 233.
23. [d.

24. See id.
25. [d.
26. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 761.
27. [d.
28. [d.
29. [d. at 762.
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Division. 3o The District Court held that the school district was
not required to pay for the special services provided by the
Academy, and that Dreher acted properly by exhausting the
administrative remedies prior to bringing a civil action. 31 The
District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Amphitheater.32 Dreher then appealed the District Court's ruling to
the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 33
III. BACKGROUND
A.

THE CONTROVERSY OVER DEAF EDUCATION

Deafness isolates individuals in a way unlike that faced by
any other disabled population. 34 Language and communication are basic parts of education, and, as a result, deaf children
historically were considered uneducable. 36 Students who enter
school without a competent language base find themselves in a
restricted environment that fails them linguistically, culturally
and educationally.36 Proponents of educating deaf and hearing
children separately have argued that isolation from one's own
linguistic and intellectual potential is much more serious than
physical isolation from able-bodied peers. 37
To minimize the potential isolation from peers and family
members, deaf children must develop language. 3s "Educators
of deaf and hearing-impaired children want the same thing: 'to

30. See generally Dreher, 797 F. Supp. 753. The Individuals with Disabilities
in Education Act provides that "[a)ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the state administrative hearings may bring a "civil action [in) any State
court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States without
regard to the amount in controversy." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988).
31. Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 762.
32. [d.
33. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230.
34. Suzanne J. Shaw, What's "Appropriate?"; Finding a Voice for Deaf Children
and Their Parents in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 14 U.
PuGET SOUND L. REV. 351 (1991).
35. [d. See Oliver Sacks, SEEING VOICES: A JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD OF THE
DEAF 9 (1989).
36. See Shaw supra note 34 at 369.
37. [d. at 370.
38. Elizabeth New Weld, Teaching the Deaf: 2 Schools of Thought Methods
Differ on How to Give 'Priceless Diamond of Language', BOSTON GLOBE, November
11, 1990, North Weekly, at 1.
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give deaf children the priceless diamond of language at the
earliest possible moment' .... But they differ on how to do
that.,,39 Language is often considered a conduit of culture, and
parents of deaf children must decide which language and
which culture to embrace at first.40 Two opposite approaches
dominate the controversy: oralism and sign language. 41
Sign language includes two basic components: American
Sign Language (hereinafter "ASL") and Signed English.42
American Sign Language, a manual language with its own
grammar and syntax, has been declared an official foreign
language to fulfill college requirements in some states. 43
Signed English, in which the manual ASL signs follow an
English-based word order, is not viewed as a true language by
ASL proponents. 44 Rather, it combines ASL and English to
assist deaf students to become more proficient in English.45
At the other end of the spectrum is the oral philosophy,
which descended from Alexander Graham Bell. 46 Bell, who
could sign well,47 argued against teaching children to join a
deaf culture that isolates them from the hearing world. 48 Advocates of the oral method argue that students who are taught
to read lips and talk are better equipped to study in the mainstream of regular classrooms with hearing children. 49 They
contend that it is easier to learn sign language later in life
than to learn English.50
The controversy between oralists and sign language proponents continues today.51 Parents and educators are at odds
39.Id.
40.Id.
41. Id.
42. See Weld, supra note 38.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Sound & Fury, Los ANGELES TIMES, November 21, 1993, Magazine, at 44.
47. Id. Bell used sign language to communicate with his wife and mother,
both of whom were deaf. Id.
48. Id.
49. Daniel Ling, Ph.D., Modes of Communication in Educational Settings,
RIGHTS OF THE HEARING IMPAIRED 48 (1990). See Weld, supra note 38.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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over which method is best for educating deaf children. 52 The
issue becomes whether a government entity or an individual's
parents should have the authority to decide what language will
be used in educating a child. 53
B.

INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES IN EDUCATION ACT

Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities in Education ActM (hereinafter "IDEA") in 1975 as the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act (hereinafter "EAHCA").55
EAHCA originated as an amendment to the Education for the
Handicapped Act of 1970.56 Following a semantic trend, Congress changed the name of EAHCA to IDEA in 1990.57 However, the original 1975 EAHCA language outlined many of the
provisions present in the current IDEA. 58
In the IDEA, Congress explained the need for the legislation. 59 The IDEA states that education is to be: (1) provided to
all age eligible children with disabilities;(2) offered in the least
restrictive placement appropriate; (3) provided at no cost; and
(4) individualized for each student. so To receive federal funds
under IDEA, a state must develop and implement a policy of
providing free appropriate public education to all children with

52. See, e.g., Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir.
1994).
53. [d.
54. Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 25, and 42 U.S.C.).
55. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see Pub. L. No. 94-142, Sec.
1 (1975).
56. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970).
57. Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990 § 901(a)(3), Pub.
L. No. 101-476 (1990). In the 1980's, the words "handicapped" and "disabled" as
descriptive language began to be replaced by "people with disabilities" as more
politically correct terminology. This semantic trend paralleled a growing civil rights
movement which brought heightened social consciousness and acceptance of people
with disabilities as a class in need of protection from discrimination under the
law. See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY (1993) (providing a detailed history
of the disability rights movement). See also Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment, Crip'
pies, Overcomers and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and
Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1341 (1993).
58. See Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121 (1970).
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (Supp. V 1993).
60. LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAw (1992).
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disabilities within that state. 61
1.

An Appropriate Public Education

The IDEA defines "free appropriate public education" as:
"special education and related services which (A) have been
provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency, (C) include an appropriate ... education in
the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the
individual education program .... "62
The IDEA mandates that each local educational agency is
responsible for establishing, reviewing, revising, implementing
and keeping IEP records for every student with a disability.63
The IEP is to be developed at a meeting of the interested parties, including "a representative of the local educational agency ... who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction . . . , the teacher, the
parents or guardian ... and, whenever appropriate, [the]
ch 1'ld . . . . "64
One objective of the IDEA is to provide an appropriate
education tailored to the individual needs of each child. 65 The
Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he educational opportunities
provided by our public school systems undoubtedly differ from
student to student, depending on a myriad of factors that
might affect a particular student's ability to assimilate information presented in a classroom."66 One plan for all students
with disabilities or a generalized plan for each disability would
be inappropriate, since each individual has different needs. 67

61. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. V 1993); 34 C.F.R. § 300.110 (1994).
62. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1988); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401 (1994).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(4),(6) (Supp. V 1993).
64. [d. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 60, at 106 n. 175. See Johnson v.
Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit, 757 F. Supp. 606, 620 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (curriculum created for hearing impaired student must be tailored to meet individual
needs).
65. Johnson, 757 F. Supp. at 617.
66. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982).
67. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 60, at 107.
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Beyond the requirement that educational programming be
individualized, details regarding content limits and related
services within the definition of "appropriate" remain undetermined in the statute. 68 The Supreme Court has held that the
primary responsibility for choosing the educational method
most suitable to a child's needs is left to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the child's parent or guardian. 69 However, clarification of ambiguity in individual cases
is left to the courts. 70
To evaluate whether an IEP is adequate and appropriate,
courts must determine the answer to a central question, namely whether the IEP "addresses the child's education needs so as
to assure [some educational benefit to the child] in the least
restrictive environment consistent with that goal."71 The IEP
need not reflect the only appropriate choice nor the
parents'choice nor the best choice, but only that which meets
the minimum federal standards. 72
In developing an IEP, schools must find a compromise
between the minimum federal standards and the best means
available to educate the individua1. 73 Parent participation in
the development of an IEP can help elucidate the best means
of educating a particular child. 74 Based on experience and familiarity, a parent often knows the type of stimulus or reinforcement to which the child will respond and can learn.75
Because of the value of this information in the IEP process,
IDEA regulations provide detailed assurances for maximizing
parental involvement. 76

68. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18).
69. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
70. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 60, at 108-14.
71. Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm'n, 910 F.2d 983 (lst Cir. 1990). See also
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198.
72. G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 942 (lst Cir. 1991) (minimum
standards require providing services which guarantee a reasonable probability of
educational benefit).
73. See id. at 948-49.
74. [d. at 948.
75. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 60, at 107.
76. [d. These requirements include providing sufficient notice to parents and
scheduling meetings at a mutually agreeable time and place. 34 C.F.R. §
300.345(d).
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A Free Public Education

The term "free" in "free appropriate public education"
means that the educational program must be provided at public expense. 77 If a school district is unable to provide appropriate education services to fulfill an IEP utilizing its existing
staff, outside resources are often used. 78 Where a child is referred to a private agency by a school system, it is the state
educational agency's responsibility to ensure that the program
is provided at no cost to the parents. 79 When a school system
offers to provide an appropriate education, as defined in the
student's IEP, at the expense of the public, then it has furnished a free appropriate public education. so However, parents who choose to place their child in a private school generally are not entitled to receive reimbursement or payment for
that private education from the public education system. 81

3.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The IDEA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies
before a private right of action accrues. 82 Exhaustion generally is required to prevent premature judicial interference with
agency processes, so that, among other reasons, the agency
may function efficiently and have an opportunity to correct its
own mistakes. s3 Administrative exhaustion is based on the

300.345(d).
77. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401. See Parks v. Pavkovic, 557 F.
Supp. 1280, 1287 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (collecting a portion of special education costs
from parents violates federal law).
78. See RoTHSTEIN, supra note 60 at 115.
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.401. See Johnson, 757 F. Supp.
at 621 (district must reimburse parents for past speech therapy determined to be
educationally necessary).
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(D).
81. 34 C.F.R. § 300.403. Courts have identified a limited exception when families, exercising a first amendment right to freedom of religion, place a child with a
disability in a parochial school. In such cases, the public education system must
provide the child with services necessary to fulfill the IEP in a parochial school
setting. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.
1992).
82. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (detailing the administrative
procedure and safeguards in the IDEA).
83. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975).
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idea that "agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary
responsibility for the programs that Congress directed them to
administer."84 Because administrative procedures were designed to simplify and make more uniform grievance procedures, they are presumed to be an appropriate vehicle to challenge government agency action. 85 Exhaustion of the administrative process allows agencies to exercise their discretion and
expertise, furthers the development of a complete factual record and promotes judicial efficiency by giving agencies an
opportunity to correct errors prior to judicial involvement. 86
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist.,87 the Ninth
Circuit noted that Amphitheater had developed an IEP specifically designed to meet Dreher's needs, as required by federal
law. 88 Amphitheater offered Dreher a free appropriate public
education had the parents chosen to accept the IEP. 89 The
court found the special education services provided to Dreher
at the Academy inconsistent with the IEP, because they did
not meet her educational needs as determined by Amphitheater.90
According to the IDEA, should parents wish to modify an
IEP, they must bring an appeal through a specific hearing
process, and exhaust all administrative remedies prior to judicial review. 91 Although Dreher's parents exhausted an administrative review of the 1989-90 IEP, they did not pursue the
two subsequent IEPs, against which they offered identical com-

84. Hoeft v. Tuc80n Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1992)
(quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081, 1086 (1992».
85. Id. at 1302-04.
86. Id. at 1302. See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95
(1969) (discussing policies regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies).
87. 22 F.3d at 228 (9th Cir. 1994).
88. Id. at 230. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
89. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 231.
90.Id.
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 states, in relevant part: "Whenever a complaint has been
received . . . the parents . . . shall have an opportunity for an impartial due process hearing which shall be conducted by the state educational agency or by the
local educational agency or the intermediate educational unit, as determined by
State law or by the State educational agency." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 10

188

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:177

plaints, through the process outlined in the federallaw. 92 The
Ninth Circuit found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to review issues arising from the subsequent IEPs. 93
The court reviewed the original complaint and held that
the school district need not pay for services related to the education of a student with a disability when those services do not
conform to the student's IEP. 94 Since educational services provided to Dreher at the Academy conflict with those outlined in
her IEP,95 the court denied Dreher's claim for reimbursement
of her speech therapy fees at the Academy, and found in favor
of Amphitheater. 96
The court refused to consider the merits of the issue,
raised for the first time on appeal, that Amphitheater violated
the IDEA by failing to call a meeting between the parents, the
private school and the district to formulate her IEP. 97 The
federal regulations require Amphitheater to initiate a meeting
with the parents and a representative of the private educational institution which the child attends. 9B
Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that no such meeting took place, the court held that administrative remedies had
not been exhausted regarding this issue since Dreher failed to
appeal the IEPs for the 1990-91 and 1991-92 school years. 99
Because Dreher appealed the IEP for 1989-90, the court noted
that the family was aware of the availability of such review,
and failed to pursue it.loO Reversing the lower court's determination, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Drehers were bound
to exhaust this issue through the administrative appeals process prior to filing a private judicial action. 10l The Ninth Circuit ruled that, due to Dreher's failure to exhaust available

92. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 235.
93. [d.
94. [d. at 231.
95. [d. at 234.
96. [d.

97.
98.
99.
100.

Dreher, 22 F.3d at 234-35.
[d. at 234-35. (referring to 34 C.F.R. § 300.349).
[d.
[d. at 230.

101. [d.
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administrative remedies, the court lacked jurisdiction, and
declined to reach the merits of the claim. 102
V.

CRITIQUE

The Ninth Circuit held that since Dreher failed to appeal
the 1990-91 and 1991-92 IEPs, the administrative remedies
had not been exhausted. loa Therefore, the court found that it
lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of Dreher's new
claims. 104
Dreher challenged only the 1989-90 IEP through the administrative process and appealed that determination through
the federal courtS. l05 The 1989-90 IEP called for sign language instruction, the educational program component with
which the Drehers disagreed. 106 The two subsequent IEPs also specified sign language instruction. l07 Rather than reiterate identical complaints by appealing the later IEPs, the
Drehers focused their appeal on the original IEP.
By noting Dreher's omission, the Ninth Circuit indicated
that a complainant is required to challenge every IEP developed by a school district and exhaust administrative remedies
for each one before a right to a judicial remedy accrues. lOS
Under this logic, a complainant might not gain timely access to
the courts, as a new IEP must be developed for each student
every school year. l09
However, when Dreher's original complaint reached the
federal courts, a new issue was raised on appeal. 110 Dreher
contended that Amphitheater violated the IDEA by failing to
invite either the parents or a representative of the Academy to

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230.
See Dreher, 22 F.3d at 235.
[d.
[d. at 230.
[d.

Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230.
See id. at 235.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993).
Dreher, 22 F.3d at 234-35.
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participate in developing the 1990-91 or 1991-92 IEP.1l1 The
Ninth Circuit found that Dreher failed to meet the exhaustion
requirement regarding the parental involvement issue, since
she appealed only the 1989-90 IEP regarding sign language
instruction. 112
This seems a correct application of the exhaustion requirement, since Amphitheater had not been afforded an opportunity to correct its own mistake in an administrative hearing. 113
Had the Ninth Circuit applied the exhaustion requirement to
find that Dreher had no right to challenge the sign language
component of the IEPs, it would have contradicted the U.S.
Supreme Court holding in Board of Education v. Rowley. 114
The court stated in Rowley that "[t]he District Court retained
jurisdiction to grant relief because the alleged deficiencies in
the IEP were capable of repetition .... "115 If the educational
program component being challenged is repeated from year to
year, requiring exhaustion of each IEP seems fruitless. u6
Sign language had been repeated as the appropriate education
method for Dreher in all three of the IEPs.l17 Therefore, the
exhaustion requirement regarding the sign language issue had
been met. 118
The Supreme Court also held in Rowley that courts may
review an IEP after a school year has ended, and, presumably
after a new IEP has been developed. 119 An IEP does not become automatically moot when a new IEP is developed. 120
"Judicial review invariably takes more than nine months to
complete, not to mention the time consumed during the preced111. [d. at 235.
112. [d.
113. See Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1302 (1992). See
supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text for discussion of the exhaustion require-

ment.
114. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 186 (1982). Had the court
held that an IEP becomes moot once a new IEP is developed, regardless of the
program component being challenged, the procedural safeguards built into the
IDEA would be compromised.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

[d.
[d.

Dreher, 22 F.3d at 230.
[d. at 231.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 186.
[d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss1/10

14

Jenkins: Administrative Law

1995]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

191

ing state administrative hearings. In Honig v. Doe,121 the Supreme Court acknowledged plaintiff's contention that a party
seeking review under section 1415(e)(2) of the IDEA must
exhaust "time-consuming administrative remedies. "122
However, the Court provided a method by which complainants may bypass the administrative process in certain instances. 123 The Court found situations in which it is inappropriate
to require the use of the procedural safeguards set out in the
IDEA before filing a lawsuit, including complaints that: "(1) it
would be futile to use the due process procedures; (2) an agency has adopted a policy or pursued a practice of general applicability that is contrary to the law; (3) it is improbable that
adequate relief can be obtained by pursuing administrative
remedies. "124
Applying the futility approach, the District Court did not
require Dreher to exhaust the administrative remedies by
appealing the 1990-91 and 1991-92 IEPs regarding sign language instruction. 125 Subsequent challenges to the sign language component would have been futile since Amphitheater
had already determined that the oral method of speech therapy
provided at the Academy was inconsistent with Dreher's
IEP. 126
VI. CONCLUSION
In Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist.,127 the
Ninth Circuit held that until a party exhausts available administrative remedies regarding the education of children with
disabilities, courts lack jurisdiction to review complaints. 128
School districts must provide a free appropriate public education, individualized for each student with a disability.129 The

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
[d. at 186-87 n.9 (citing Honig, 484 U.S. at 327).
[d.
Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 762. See Honig, at 326-27.
[d.
Dreher, 797 F. Supp. at 761-62.
22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994).
[d. at 231.
20 U.S.C. § 1401 (a)(18)(D) (1988).
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development of an appropriate individualized education program for a student must include participation of the parents
and a representative of any private educational institution
from which the student receives services. lao However, the final decision about the education methodology to be offered by a
public school system lies with the school district. 131
Parents may challenge a school district's IEP through an
administrative hearing process containing certain procedural
safeguards required by federal law. 132 Once the administrative process has been exhausted, appeals may be brought in
the federal courts. 133
In Dreher, the Ninth Circuit identified two distinct applications of the exhaustion requirement. 134 With regard to an
issue raised for the first time on appeal, the court declined to
reach the merits of the claim due to the complainant's failure
to exhaust the administrative remedies regarding that issue. 135 However, the Ninth Circuit held that appropriate exhaustion of the remainder of the claims had been attained, and
reached a final determination regarding those issues. 136
Caren Jenkins'

130. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343, 300.349.
131. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207.
132. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (a)·(d) (1988 & SuPp. V 1993).
133. ld.
134. Dreher, 22 F.3d at 231.
135. ld. at 235.
136. ld. at 234.
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